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"UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN"A NOTE ON FREE SPEECH AND
THE WARREN COURT
Harry Kalven, Jr.*
are several ways to give at the outset, in quick summary, an over-all impression of the Warren Court in the area
of the first amendment. The quotation in the title can for many
reasons be taken as its trademark. The quotation comes, of course,
from a statement about public debate made in the Court's preeminent decision, New York Times v. Sullivan,1 and it carries echoes
of Alexander Meiklejohn.2 ,ve have, according to Justice Brennan,
"a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open ...." 3
What catches the eye is the daring, unconventional selection of
adjectives. These ·words capture the special quality of the Court's
stance toward first amendment issues. They express the gusto and
enthusiasm with which the Court has tackled such issues. They indicate an awareness that heresy is robust; that counterstatement on
public issues, if it is to be vital and perform its function, may not
always be polite. And, most significantly, they express a desire to
make a fresh statement about the principles of free speech rather
than simply repeat the classic phrases of Holmes in Abrams4 and
Brandeis in Whitney. 5 The Court is interested enough to be minting
contemporary epigrams--to be making it its own.
For a further impression of the Court's work in the first amendment field, we might turn to the 1959 case involving Lady Chatterly's
Lover in movie form, Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents. 6 Chiefly
because of an inability to agree on precisely how the court below had
disposed of the case, the Supreme Court, although unanimous in
reversing, found it necessary to produce six separate opinions.7 Of
particular interest for the moment is Justice Stewart's opinion: he

T

HERE

• Professor of Law, Cni,ersity of Chicago. A.B. 1935, J.D. 1938, University of
Chicago.-Ed.
I. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Meiklejohn, Free Speech in Relation to Self-Government, republished in A.
l\lEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); cf. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note
on the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 221;
Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amend•
ment, 79 HARV. L. REV. l (1965).
3. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
4. Abrams v. United States, 250 tr.s. 616 (1919).
5. Whitney v. California. 274 t:.S. 357 (1927).
6. 360 U.S. 684 (19.59).
7. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REv. 1,
28-34.
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read the court below as banning the movie because it had dealt too
sympathetically -with adultery. In meeting this objection he was
moved to restate the basic principle with notable freshness:
It is contended that the State's action was justified because the
motion picture attractively portrays a relationship which is contrary
to the moral standards, the religious precepts, and the legal code of
its citizenry. This argument misconceives what it is that the Constitution protects. Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of
ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects
advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper no
less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax. And in the realm of
ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which
is unconvincing. 8

Again what strikes the special note is not just the firm grasp of the
basic principle but the gallantry, if you will, of its restatement. It
is easier to champion freedom for the thought we hate than for the
thought that embarrasses.
Yet another way of reducing to quick summary the special quality of this Court with regard to first amendment issues is to compare
the opinions in Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts,9 decided in
1967, with the opinion in Debs v. United States. 10 The Debs case
was decided March 10, 1919, exactly one week after Schenck 11 had
launched the clear-and-present-danger formula. In an opinion by
Justice Holmes, the Court affirmed Debs' conviction (carrying a tenyear prison sentence) for attempting to incite insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, and refusal of duty in the armed forces and for
attempting to obstruct tbe recruiting and enlistment service of the
United States in violation of the Espionage Act of 1917. The overt
conduct of Debs consisted solely in making a public speech to a
general adult audience in Canton, Ohio. At the time he was a major
national political figure, and in 1920 he was to run as the Socialist
candidate for President from prison and receive over 900,000 votes. 12
The speech itself, which is summarized -i-n Justfoe Holmes'
opinion, involved a criticism of war in general and World War I in
particular from a Socialist point of view. It asserted, for example,
that "the master class has always declared the war and the subject
class has always fought the battles ... .''13 It expressed sympathy for
several others already convicted for their opposition to the war, say-

IN

8. 360 U.S . .at 688-89.
9. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
10. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
11. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
12. There is a discussion of the case and its background in Z. CHAFEE, FREE
THE UNITED STATES 84-86 (1941).
13. 249 U.S. 211, 213 (1919).
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ing that "if they were guilty so was he."U It appears that most of the
speech was devoted to Socialist themes apart from the war, and it
concluded with the exhortation: "Don't worry a_bout the charge of
treason to your masters; but be concerned about the treason that
involves yourselves.'' 15 During the trial Debs addressed the jury
himself and stated: "I have been accused of obstructing the war. I
admit it. Gentlemen, I abhor war. I would oppose the war if I stood
alone.'' 16
The Court disposed of the case in a perfunctory two-page
opinion, treating as the chief question whether a jury could find that
"one purpose of the speech, whether incidental or not does not
matter, was to oppose not only war in general but this war, and that
the opposition was so expressed that its natural and intended effect
would be to obstruct recruiting.'' 17 The first amendment defense
exacted only the follmving sentence from Justice Holmes: "The
chief defenses upon which the defendant seemed willing to rely
were the denial that we have dealt with and that based upon the
First Amendment to the Constitution, disposed of in Schenck v.
United States ... .'' 18 The decision was unanimous and without any
comment from Justice Brandeis.19
Let us now jump a half century to Butts. At issue there was a
judgment under state law in a libel action brought by a noted football coach against a national magazine for an article which in effect
accused him of "fixing" a college football game by giving his team's
secrets in advance of the game to the opposing coach. The case produced an elaborate outpouring of opinions and an intricate pattern
of votes in the five-to-four decision affirming the judgment. All
Justices agreed that since Butts was a public figure, the reporting
of his activities was in. the public domain and therefore the state
libel law was subject to the discipline of the first amendment. The
Justices divided over what level of privilege the defendant publisher
must be given to satisfy the constitutional concern with freedom of
U.S. at 214.
U.S. at 214.
U.S. at 214.
U.S. at 215.
U.S. at 215. Holmes' reaction makes it evident that the clear-and-presentdanger dictum did not in his mind become a constitutional test until sometime after
Schenck. Professor Chafee has suggested Holmes was waiting for Abrams: "Looking
backward, however, we see that Justice Holmes was biding his time until the Court
should have before it a conviction so dearly wrong as to let him speak out his deepest
thoughts about the First Amendment." Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 86
(1941). It would be a worthwhile task to explore what it meant about Justice Holmes
that he could see Abrams but not Debs as the "clearly wrong" case.
19. It did, however, evoke an eloquent shocked dissent from Professor Ernst Freund
of The University of Chicago Law School. See Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of
speech, NEw REPUBuc, May 3, 1919, at 13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
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speech. Three separate positions were expressed: Justices Black and
Douglas would have granted an absolute or unqualified privilege not
defeasible by any showing of malice. At the other extreme, Justice
Harlan, joined by Justices Clark, Fortas, and Stewart, held the privilege defeated by a showing of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible journalists." The
middle ground was occupied by Justices Brennan, White, and the
Chief Justice, who would have adhered to the- standards set forth in
New Yark Times and thus would have held the privilege defeasible
by actual malice-defined as "knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for truth." Out of this unpromising and apparently trivial
factual context came deeply felt essays on freedom of speech by
Justices Harlan, Black, and the Chief Justice.20 In wondering about
all this on another-occasion, I observed:
This is perhaps the fitting moment to pause to marvel at the
pattern of the Court's argument on this issue. The Court was divided
5 to 4 on whether the constitutional standard for the conditional
privilege of those who libel public figures is that it be defeasible only
upon a showing of reckless disregard for truth or merely on a showing of an extreme departure from professional newspaper standards!
Further it was understood that the chief significance of the standard
relates simply to how jury instructions will be worded. Yet this
nuance triggered a major debate in the court on the theory of free
speech.21

And in speculating on why these issues held such e~traordinary
power to move the Supreme Court-after noting that in the sequence of cases following New York Times the Court had located a
novel and difficult issue involving "public speech interlaced with
comments on individuals"-! could only add: "Second, it shows
once again-and it is a splendid thing-that all members of this
Court care deeply about free speech values and their proper handling
by law. Only a concerned Court would have worked so hard on such
a problem." 22
The difference between Debs and Butts is a measure of how
much the Court's approach to free speech has changed over the years
since ·world War I. And it is a difference, it will be noted, in result,
in theory, in style, and, above all, in concern.28
20. The details on the judicial patterns are analyzed in Kalven, The Reasonable
Man and the First .Amendment: Hill, Butts and Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 267.
21. Id. at 307.
22. Id. at 308.
211. Of course, by no means is all of this difference to be attributed to the Warren
Court, but see text part II infra. Two other recent decisions clamor for comparison with
the Debs case: Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), where the Court enjoined the
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But even as one acknowledges the deep concern of this Court
for the first amendment, there is need to pause at the outset for a
perplexity and an irony. The perplexity is one that must have
troubled all the contributors to this Symposium: What exactly is one
referring to when he speaks of the Warren Court?24 Are we simply
using the Chief Justiceship as a device to mark off a span of years?
Would it have been any more arbitrary to talk of the work of the
Court from, say, 1958 to 1964? If we find some distinctive traits in
that work, as both friends and critics of the Court are so readily
prone to do in the first amendment area, to whom are we ascribing
them? To some durable team of Justices? To the special influence
of the Chief? The Court's roster during the Warren years has included some seventeen Justices, and the "\Varren Court" has for
varying periods of time numbered among its members Justices
Minton, Burton, Clark, V/hittaker, Reed, Jackson, Goldberg, and
Frankfurter.25 Perhaps we should adapt the old Greek conundrum
and ask if we can comment on the same Court twice.
I would hesitate to adopt the alternative and say that what unifies
the topic is the distinctive influence of the Chief Justice on the
Court's response to the first amendment. This would require not
only that we find a distinctive pattern of decisions, but that we
connect it up somehow to the chairmanship of the Chief-which
seems to me to attribute excessive power to that office.
But perhaps I am being too solemn about it all. There has indeed been a kind of first amendment. team: Black and Douglas have
been on the Court during the entire tenure of the Chief Justice.
Brennan and Harlan were appointed in 1956, and Stewart in 1958.
And it is the analysis and response of these six Justices to the first
amendment that I have· chiefly in mind in considering the ·warren
Georgia legislature from refusing to seat Julian Bond for making a speech expressing
"s}mpathy and support for the men in this country who are unwilling to respond to
a military draft"; and United States v. O"Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) .where the Court
upheld against a first amendment challenge the federal statute making it a felony
knowingly to destroy or mutilate a draft card. In some respects the O'Brien case is
reminiscent of the Court's response in Debs and perhaps indicates that no Supreme
Court has yet acted with much independence about speech during wartime. In any
event, one careful commentator has found the treatment of the first amendment
issues in the O'Brien case "astonishingly cavalier." Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic
Conduct: The Draft Card Burning Case, 1968 SUP. CT. R.Ev. I.
24. It should be acknowledged that Professor Cox in his lively and lucid review of
the Court's work was able to proceed effectively without any prefatory worries over
the unity of the topic. A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT (1968). The book begins: "The
appointment of Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the United States in 1953 marked the
opening of a new period in our consti.!_utional development."
25. See the convenient chart of the Justices in _W. LoCKHART, Y. KAMISAll, & J.
CHOI'Elt, CoNmnmONAL RIGHTS AND l.mERTIJ!$, app. A (2d ~- 1967).
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Court's reaction to free speech issues.26 At least we match here the
rough unity of topic provided, say, by talk of the greatness of the
New York Yankees in the middle 1920's.27
The irony, of course, is that it is still the Warren Court-at
least temporarily. Due to the vagaries of everyone's politics, the
October term has opened with Earl Warren back in his customary
center seat. The wretched controversy over the Fortas appointment
was_ interpreted widely as an attack more on the Court as a whole
than on Justice Fortas. The Senate was presumably providing its
own commentary on the work of the Warren Court. And for our
immediate purposes, it is striking how much of the Senate's concern
was with the work of the Court in the first amendment area. There
is a temptation to brood over the gap which appears to have been
created between the first amendment values the Court has championed and those the public, or a considerable segment of the public,
will tolerate. Is there, then, a political limit on the meaning of the
first amendment? Two offsetting considerations should, in any event,
be noted. The Senate's free-speech grievances related almost exclusively, so far as I could tell, to the decisions on obscenity and did
not put in issue the striking work of the Court in other areas of
first amendment concern.28 Further, such a gap between public and
judicial attitudes may be a healthy sign. The tradition has never
been that freedom of speech was a value to be left to majority vote;
indeed, that may be the whole point of the first amendment and of
judicial review under it.

I.
At the Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago there is a
chart which occupies a long wall and which graphs over time the
changes in human technology. The time span is some 50,000 years,
and the introduction of each technological advance-from the first
crude stone used as a tool for digging to today's latest electronic or
space age wonders-is entered on the graph. The result is a stunning
visual impression of the acceleration of cultural inheritance. Man has
made more major technical advances in the past 100 years than in
the previous 49,9001
26. It is arguable that the core of the Warren Court, at least for first amendment
cases, has really been just the four: Justice Brennan, Justice Stewart, the Chief Justice,
and Justice Harlan. While Justices Black and Douglas have joined in the decisions,
they have often stood some~hat apart in matters of doctrine as in obscenity, libel, and
congressional committee sequences.
Zl. You know-Ruth, Gehrig, Meusel, Lazzeri, Combs, Hoyt, et al.
28. However, The Chicago Tribune, Oct. 13, 1968, carried an editorial on the
Court entitled, "Will the Supreme Court Mend Its Ways?" which listed and expressed
displeasure over some elevc!D decisions inhibiting the control of subversive activities.
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There is a general analogy here to the making of law. Invention
seems to breed invention, and precedent breeds more precedent. But
I cite the Museum wall to make a specific point about the Warren
Court. If one were to imagine a comparable scheme charting the
incidence of first amendment cases from 1791 to date, the parallel
would be striking indeed; we would get a proper sense of the accelerated accumulation of first amendment precedents in the past
fifteen years. The point is, I think, a neutral one. It goes for the
moment not to the quality of the Court's answers but to its willingness to confront first amendment questions at an unprecedented rate.
The result is that a great part of the law, and a greater part of what
is of interest today to the teacher or commentator, is the work of the
Warren Court.
Even the quickest survey makes the point. All of the constitutional decisions on obscenity have come from this Court, starting
with Roth29 in 1957; if one is interested in law and obscenity he will
perforce find himself studying essentially the work of the Warren
Court.30 Similarly, the constitutional law on libel has-with the
exception of Beauharnais31 in 1952--come from this Court, starting
with New York Times3 2 in 1964. And, moving to areas where there
was some prior precedent, the impression is not much changed.
Think what TVatkins, 33 Barenblatt, 34 Sweezy, 35 Uphaus, 36 Braden, 31
Wilkin~on, 38 Yellin, 39 Gibson, 40 and DeGregory41 have added to the
law on congressional investigating committees; the precedents previously consisted of little more than Kilbourn v. Thompson 42 in 1881,
ivlcGrain v. Daugherty 43' in 1927, and Rumely v. United States44 in
1953. Or, to take one final ready example, think of the law on use
of the public forum: the major stimulus to the development of this
body of law provided by the Jehovah's Witnesses in the 1930's and
29. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
30. See Kalven, supra note 7; Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966
Sup. CT. REv. 7.
31. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
32. 376 U.S. 254.
33. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
34. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
35. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
36. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
37. Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
38. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
39. Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963).
40. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
41. DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 (1966).
42. 103 U.S. 168.
43. 273 U.S. 135.
44. 345 U.S. 41.
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early 1940's45 has been overshadowed by the notable contributions of
the Warren Court in Garner v. Louisiana,46 Edwards v. South Carolina,47 Cox v. Louisiana,48 Brown v. Louisiana,49 and Adderley v.
Florida. 50
Let me approach the matter a little less impressionistically.
Taking Lockhart, Kamisar, and Choper's casebook, Constitutional
Rights and Liberties, we can make the point in rough quantitative
terms. The book is intensely concerned with first amendment issues,
and the latest edition51 devotes some 340 pages to them. The editors
rate eighty-nine cases worthy of special study; of these, a total of
fifty-five, or over 60 per cent, have been decided by the Warren
Court.
There is perhaps one other way of putting into perspective how
much the Warren Court has enriched the constitutional doctrine of
freedom of speech, press, and assembly. It is to compare the classic
book in the field, Chafee's Free Speech in the United States, first
published in 1920 and republished in elaborated form in 1941, with
the current corpus of law. A book today performing the function of
Chafee's volume would look notably different, deal to a considerable
degree with different principles, and confront to a considerable
extent different problems. If the analytic density of the Chafee book
were to be maintained, the contemporary treatment would surely
require two volumes; and the second volume would be devoted to
the work of the Warren Court.
II.

It is not feasible within the compas; of this-Article to attempt a
systematic review of the results-the Coun has achieved in the various
areas of first amendment law. I should prefer, therefore, to check off
briefly some of the new ideas the Court has introduced into the field.
New York Times may have effected a major alteration in official
thinking about free speech. To begin with, the Court introduced
the attractive notion that the first amendment b.as a "central meaning" and thus suggested the possibility of a "core" theory of free
speech. The central meaning suggested in Times appears to be the
notion that seditious libel is not actionable.
It must be admitted that the promise of radical rethinking of the
45. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
CT. REV. 1.
46. Gamer v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
47. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
48. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
49. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
50. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
51. 1967.

SUP.
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theory and rationale of the first amendment which this invites has
not as yet been judicially pursued.152 The Court has been careful,
however, to preserve the status of New York Times as a key precedent.53 The Court has also made visible a new kind of problem in
Times and its sequelae: the question of whether falsity in fact as
contrasted with falsity in doctrine is entitled to any protection.
This problem arises when discussion of issues in the public domain
is interlaced with statements of fact about particular individuals.
The issue is whether in protecting the individual's interest in reputation or privacy we will give him a veto power over the general
discussion. This was the problem in Times itself and again in Time
Inc'. v. Hill, Butts, and Associated Press v. Walker; it looms as a
large issue since much public discussion appears to have this mixed
quality. 54 The dilemma is a difficult one, but the Court has confronted it and, to my mind, has made real progress toward a satisfactory solution.
Perhaps equally important is the abrogation of outmoded ideas
by the Court; the most significant step here, I suggest, has been the
great reduction in the status and prestige of the clear-and-presentdanger test. Immediately prior to the advent of the '\Varren Court,
this test had a considerable claim as the criterion of the constitutionality of an exercise of governmental authority over communication. In limited areas the test may still be alive, but it has
been conspicuous by its absence from opinions in the last decade.
Since the test-whatever sense it may have made in the limited
context in which it originated-is clumsy and artificial when expanded into a general criterion of permissible speech, the decline in
its fortunes under the Warren Court seems to be an intellectual
gain.
Another major conceptual contribution of the ·warren Court
has been development of the idea of self-censorship. A regulation
of communication may run afoul of the Constitution not because
it is aimed directly at free speech, but because in operation it may
trigger a set of behavioral consequences which amount in effect to
people censoring themselves in order to avoid trouble with the law.
The idea has appeared in several cases, and, while the Court has not
yet addressed a major opinion to it, it has all the earmarks of a
seminal concept. The cases have varied in context from Speiser v.
52. Sec note 2 supra.
53. Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hills, Butts and
Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. 267, 308.
54. This appears to be an instance of a general problem. Compare Judge Hand's
comment on another instance of utterances with "a double aspect." United States v.
Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950). See also Kalven, supra note 7, at 11-12.
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Randall,55 to Smith v. California, 56 to Time Inc. v. Hill. 51 In Speiser
the Court invalidated a state statute requiring affidavits of non-Communist affiliation as a condition for a tax exemption. The vice was
a subtle one: as the Court understood the state procedure, the affidavit was not conclusive; thus the burden of proof of nonsubversion
was left on the applicant. The Court stated:
The vice of the present procedure is that, where the particular
speech falls close to the line separating the lawful and the unlawful,
the possibility of mistaken factfinding-inherent in all litigationwill -create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized.
The man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade
another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far
~vider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these
burdens.58 --

In Smith the Court confronted an ordinance imposing strict criminal liability on the sellers of obscene books. Again, the Court found
the vice in the chain of consequences such regulation might engender:
·
By dispensing with any requirement of knowledge of the contents
of the book on the part of the seller, the ordinance tends to impose
a severe limitation on the public's access to constitutionally protected
matter. For if the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge
of the contents, and the ordinance fulfills its purpose, he will tend to
restrict the books lie sells to those he has inspected; and thus the
State will have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature.... The bookseller's self-censorship, compelled by the State, would be a censorship
affecting the whole public, hardly less virulent for being privately
administered.59
Finally, in the context of tort liability for "false light" privacy, -the
Court in Hill conceptualized the problem as one of triggering selfcensorship; it thus would give the publisher a conditional privilege
defeasible only by actual malice:
We create grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensable
service of a free press in a free society if we saddle the press with the
impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the facts associated in
a news article with a person's name, picture or portrait, particularly
as related to nondefamatory matter. Even negligence would be a
most elusive standard especially when the content of the speech itself
affords no warning of prospective harm to another through falsity.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

357
361
385
357
361

U.S. 513 (1958).
U.S. 147 (1959).
U.S. 374 (1967).
u.s_. 513, 526 (1958).
U.S. 147, 153-54 (1959).
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... Fear of large verdicts in damage suits for innocent or merely
negligent misstatement, even the fear of expense involved in their
defense, must inevitably cause publishers "to steer ... wider of the
unlawful zone ... :•oo
The Court is thus in command of a versatile concept which represents, I think, a fascinating addition to the vocabulary of first amendment doctrine. It should perhaps be acknowledged that the opinions
in all three cases were written by Justice Brennan.
One other potentially powerful idea of the Warren Court should
be noted: the principle that strict economy of means is required
when communication is regulated. It is not enough that the end be
legitimate; the means must not be wasteful of first amendment
values. The seeds of this notion first appeared in Schneider v. New
]ersey, 61 decided in 1939, which invalidated a prohibition against
distributing leaflets 1vhere the governmental objective was to prevent
littering the streets. But the idea was given its fullest expression by
the Warren Court in Shelton v. Tucker, 62 which voided a state
statute requiring each school teacher as a condition of employment
to file annually an affidavit listing every organization to which he
had belonged or contributed in the preceding five years. The Court
found that, although the state had a legitimate interest in the
organizational commitments of its teachers, the statute gratuitously
overshot its target. Justice Stewart stated the principle this way:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can more narrowly be achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less
drastic means for achi~~ing the same basic purpose.il3
It remains to be seen whether this principle, too, will be seminal.
There is more than a suggestion in it of a preferred-position thesis.
Legislation regulating communication may not be presumptively
unconstitutional today, but under the economy principle it will not
be entitled to, in Holmes' phrase, "a penumbra" of legislative convenience.64
U.S. 874, 889 (1967).
U.S. 147.
U.S. 479 (1960).
U.S. at 479.
Dissenting in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926): ("But the law
allows a penumbra to be embraced that goes beyond the outline of its object in
order that the object may be secured.') There is another group of related cases dealing with vagueness and requiring precision in phrasing to avoid ambiguity. See, e.g.,
Elfbrandt v. Russell, !184 U.S. 11 (1966); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, !185 U.S. 589
(1967); Aptheker v. United States, !178 U.S. 500 (1964); United States v. Robel, 389
60.
61.
62.
6!1.
64.

385
308
!164
!164
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III.
The momentum of the Warren Court in other areas of constitutional law has been the source of sustained controversy and criticism.65 Without attempting to assess the merits of such criticism in
general, I should like to explore whether in the special area of free
speech the Court's work is subject to similar disapproval.
It has frequently been objected that the Court has moved too
fast and in giant steps rather than with the gradual deliberation
appropriate to the judicial process, that its opinions have often displayed inadequate craftsmanship, that it has failed to confront the
issues and to rationalize its results with appropriate rigor. However,
if we consider for a moment the work of the Court in two important
areas--obscenity and the scope of the power of congressional investigating committees-these criticisms do not appear warranted. To be
sure there had been, as we noted, no constitutional decisions whatsoever on the obscenity issue prior to 1957. But that was simply because such cases had not come before the Court; there was no general
consensus that such regulation was constitutional. In fact, there had
long been recognized a tension between obscenity regulation and
the first amendment. It is enough to cite the widespread praise of
Judge Woolsey's decision and opinion in the Ulysses case66 to document the tension generally seen between the regulation of obscenity and the reach of the first amendment; by the time the
Supreme Court entered the field in the Roth case, judges in other
courts had explicitly noted the constitutional shadows. 67
Moreover, in Roth the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
obscenity regulation involved. In doing so, however, it recognized
and attempted to define the constitutional limitations on such regulation. While in the past decade an unusual number of obscenity
cases have reached the Supreme Court, the sequence of resulting
decisions can fairly be characterized as involving the gradual resolution of limited and closely related problems on a case-by-case basis.
Thus, Kingsley Pictures68 resolved the problems of thematic obscenity; Butler v. Michigan 69 resolved the problems of regulation of
U.S. 258 (1967). Perhaps on close analysis the vagueness, economy, and self-censorship
criteria can be made to converge.
65. Cf. Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 Term-Foreword: "Equal in Origin and
Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government", 178
HARV. L. REv. 143 (1964); A. Cox, supra note 24.
66. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1934),
afj'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
67. See the opinions of Judge Curtis Bok in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa.
D. & C. 101 (1949); and the concurring opinion of Judge Jerome Frank in the court
below in the Roth case itself, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956).
68. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
69. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
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general literature distribution keyed to what is suitable for children;
and Smith 70 dealt with permissible regulation of booksellers. Moreover, Manual Enterprises v. Day71 added the element of "patent
offensiveness" to the constitutional definition of obscenity, and
Jacobellis v. Ohio72 attached the element of "utterly without redeeming significance." If there has been a jarring note, it has come not
in accelerating the liberation of arts and letters from obscenity
,censorship, but rather from the sudden move in the opposite direction in Ginzburg v. United States13 by adding the perplexing "pandering" element to the constitutional test.
It is true that the Court has been conspicuously unsuccessful in
pleasing commentators or in reaching any consensus within itself as
to how to handle obscenity cases. It is possible to detect at least six
different doctrinal positions among the nine Justices. But this is due,
I would suggest, to the intrinsic awkwardness of the problem rather
than to a judicial failure to take the cases seriously or to face the
issues squarely. In any event, the Court cannot be criticized for rushing past existing precedent in order to abolish censorship altogether.
Similarly, in cases involving congressional investigating committees, and in particular the House Un-American Activities Committee, the Court, while recognizing a first amendment shadow, has
inched along case by case in an attempt to develop a formula of
limitation. Again, the sheer frequency of cases at the Supreme Court
level within the last decade is astonishing. In a number of casesBarenblatt,74 Uphaus, 75 Braden,76 and Wilkinson7i-the Court has
upheld committee power and refused to inquire into the motives of
the congressmen. In Watkins, 78 despite the stirring rhetoric of Chief
Justice ·warren's opinion, the actual decision was keyed to the technical requirement that. the pertinency of the committee's questions
must be made clear to a witness if he is to be legally compelled to
answer. In Yellin, 79 the decision adverse to the committee rested
simply on the committee's failure to follow its own procedural rules;
in Gibson, 80 the Court was impressed by the committee's failure to
establish a sufficient nexus or foundation for its questions; in
De Gregory, 81 the crucial factor was the staleness of the questions.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
i5.
76.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

361 U.S. 147 (1959).
370 U.S. 478 (1962).
378 U.S. 184 (1964).
383 U.S. 463 (1966).
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963).
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 (1966).
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Thus far, the Court has recognized that compulsory disclosure to an
investigating committee may inhibit freedom of speech and association, but it has found this loss a legitimate consequence of the state's
interest in finding facts. Moreover, the Court has managed to withstand the argument of four dissenters82 who have urged repeatedly
that committee inquiries into subversion violate the first amendment. Here as with obscenity the Court has not found a satisfactory
solution to the problems posed, but it has worked at them steadily,
with circumspection, and without taking giant libertarian steps.
The congressional committee cases suggest one final point about
the ,varren Court and its critics-a point on which Archibald Cox
recently commented. 83 Not infrequently the Court has been criticized for usurping power from other branches of government, for
failing to seek solutions that would ac{:ommodate the separation of
political power in our society. Yet in the congressional committee
cases, although the Court has made evident its distaste for the excesses of committee inquiry, it has been careful when deciding
against the committee to place its decision on grounds that would
leave the power ultimately in Congress. Thus if the committee follows its own rules of procedure, if it makes the pertinency of its
questions clear to the witness, if it avoids stale inquiries, and if it
lays some foundation for examining the particular witness, the
Supreme Court, as matters now stand, will ratify its power to compel
answers to its questions.
We noted at the start that the topic of the Warren Court is an
oblique, elusive one. Surely it would be easier to discuss straight
away the substantive issues the Court has dealt with rather than to
probe for some pattern of positions distinctive to the personality of
this particular Court. Nevertheless, as we also said at the outset,
there does seem to be a special trademark to this Court's work in the
area of freedom of speech, press, and assembly. There is a zest for
these problems and a creative touch in working with them. It has
been noted that there are overtones of Alexander Meiklejohn in the
Court's idiom. It may, therefore, not be inappropriate to turn to
Mr. ::\Ieiklejohn for a final comment. Speaking of the principle of
the first amendment, he once said: "We must think for it as well as
fight for it."84 The Warren Court in its enriching gloss on the
amendment over the past fifteen years has done a good deal to help
us do both.
82. See the dissents of Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and the Chief Justice in
Barenblatt, Uphaus, Braden, and Wilkinson.
83. A. Cox, THE '\VARRE."{ COUAT 104-08 (1968).
84. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLIDCAL FRE£DOM 6 (1960).

